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ARTICLES
ACCESS, CONNECTION, AND VOICE:
A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO
REPRESENTING SENIOR CITIZENS OF
QUESTIONABLE CAPACITY
PETER MAR GULIES*
INTRODUCTION
E LDER law attorneys enter an uncertain realm when they represent
senior citizens of questionable capacity.' On this terrain, issues of
professional responsibility are pervasive and basic issues about what it
means to be a lawyer come to the forefront. Coping with these issues is
challenging, even (or especially) for the conscientious practitioner. Un-
like some other areas, such as avoiding the commingling of funds or re-
fraining from communicating directly with represented adverse parties
when their counsel is absent, no safe harbor exists. Indeed, along with
the rewards of elder law practice, sensitive lawyers representing clients
with questionable capacity will endure some lost sleep, no matter what
course they choose. This Article will not erase the circles beneath a good
lawyer's eyes. However, it may, if it succeeds in anything, provide a
more organized way of thinking about problems that keep elder law
attorneys awake at night.
On the surface, much of the conflict is between autonomy and welfare.
Senior citizens need freedom of action. Yet, they sometimes seem to act
in ways that defeat their other needs, whether financial, medical, or legal.
* Associate Professor, St. Thomas University School of Law. B.A., 1978, Colgate
University; J.D., 1981, Columbia University. I thank Cynthia Barrett, Nancy Coleman,
Cliff Kruse, Michael Perlin, Jan Rein, Charlie Sabatino, and Ellen Saideman for their
comments on a previous draft of this Article. Conversations with Jacqueline Allee, Mar-
grit Bernstein, Bruce Green, and Jeff Watnick also have enriched my analysis.
1. For a pioneering analysis of the issues, see Jacqueline Allee, Representing Older
Persons: Ethical Dilemmas, Prob. & Prop. Jan./Feb. 1988, at 37; see also David Luban,
Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454 (discussing the paternalistic
role of attorneys in competence evaluations); Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly
Client and Addressing the Question of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61 (1988) (arguing
that a lawyer seeking to assess client's competence must engage in process of "gradual
counseling" and, in certain circumstances, must exercise "substituted judgment" for a
client); Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and
the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515 (discussing choices available
to lawyer representing client with impaired competency). For a succinct summary of the
problem, see Hon. Steven D. Pepe & Cecille Lindgren, Ethical Dilemmas in Elder Law:
Working with Questionably Competent Clients, Elder L. Rep., May 1991, at 1-6. One
common area of conflict is discussed in Margrit S. Bernstein, Ethical Considerations in
Estate Planning and Probate Practice, in The Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education
Committee and the Committee on the Elderly, Ethical Issues in Representing the Elderly
Client Seminar, June 15, 1990, at 2.1.
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At what point do we use concepts of capacity to curtail freedom of action
in the interest of meeting needs? Thus stated, the question seems stark.
However, a central argument of this Article is that there is an artificiality
about this distinction between autonomy and welfare. Contrary to the
above formulation, autonomy is also a need. Conversely, financial, medi-
cal, and legal welfare are essential elements of autonomy.
The dichotomy between autonomy and welfare influences how we view
lawyering for senior citizens. Models of lawyering that do not seem
obviously out of place when representing younger individuals seem
strained when dealing with some issues involving seniors. The model of
arm's length bargaining, which appears to make sense between two
merchants, does not seem to capture the crosscurrents of relationships
among family members, which often are the core of elder law practice.
As a result, the elder law attorney feels awkward in the partisan role that
might be completely appropriate for the merchant setting.
Seniors of questionable capacity exacerbate the strain.2 Traditional
Anglo-American conceptions of lawyering view lawyering as a principal-
agent relationship in which the agent-lawyer acts under authority
granted her freely and knowingly by her client-principal.3 A client's
questionable capacity compromises this authority and prompts the
lawyer to question the nature of her role. Much of this questioning is
healthy. The traditional conception of the lawyer's role is never as
natural or inevitable as it may appear. In business, to use a well-devel-
oped example, parties may have relationships that transcend bargaining
over short-term advantages. In addition, many clients who do not ap-
pear to have mental disabilities nonetheless will make foolish decisions,
and change their minds with disconcerting regularity. Attorney-client
dialogue and counseling round out the traditional conception and hu-
manize the mechanical principal-agent model. Indeed, I have argued
elsewhere for a broader view of the lawyer's role that takes into account
the interests of third parties and defines a client's interests broadly to
include, for instance, psychological in addition to strictly legal interests.4
However, there is something invidious about too eagerly jettisoning the
traditional model when it comes to challenged seniors. It is easy to think
of elderly clients as persons who are not citizens-whose wishes do not
really count. The demands of the future, of an impatient younger gener-
2. For discussions of representation of clients with mental disabilities, see Anthony
V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769 (1992); Stanley S.
Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1989); Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?":
Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68
N.C. L. Rev. 213 (1990); Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the
Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 Law & Contemp. Probs. 161
(Summer 1982).
3. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory
Analysis, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 15, 21-23 (1987).
4. See Margulies, supra note 2.
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ation, can seem themselves natural and inevitable. The natural nearness
of death also makes challenged seniors already seem spectral, people
without substance.
The presence of mental disability only compounds this phenomenon.
Many lawyers unduly defer to medical professionals when representing
clients with mental disabilities. Public interest lawyers who litigated
against paternalistic and oppressive mental health systems did not com-
mit this error; sometimes, however, they consulted more heavily with
their own conceptions of civil liberties and progressive mental health
policy than with their clients.' A balance is needed to help lawyers retain
what is empowering about the traditional conception, but transcend its
fixation on merely legal interests, and to see clients as situated in a web of
relationships. Balance is also needed in formulating the concept of
capacity. The medical profession historically has adopted a paternalistic
view of capacity based on the substance of decisions.6 If the decisions
appear "right," the individual possesses capacity. If the decisions are
"wrong," the individual lacks capacity. Lawyers and others are wary of
the latitude this substantive test leaves for second-guessing citizen
decision-making. However, in reaction to the paternalism of the substan-
tive view of capacity, lawyers have fallen back on what they know best:
procedure. The result is an abstract view of capacity that purports to
rely on an individual's decision-making processes. This process-based
view suffers from the impossibility of considering process separate from
substance, and from a lack of attention to human connection. A bal-
anced, contextual view of capacity considers both process and substance,
and situates the senior citizen in a network of family, care-givers, and
peers.
A similar balance is needed on the issue of the role of rules versus
discretion in the attorney's behavior. Rules and judgment are perversely
distributed under the current ethical regime. In some situations, such as
those where disclosure might be useful in determining capacity or where
affiliations with treatment professionals or lay groups may facilitate
capacity determinations and avoid guardianship, rules unnecessarily hem
in attorneys. In other situations, such as those in which lawyers ask
courts to impose guardianships on persons who are not present at the
hearing or those in which lawyers offer legal advice to third parties, such
5. See Herr, supra note 2, at 611 (quoting one public interest lawyer as conceding
that, "I played God. I never met [the named class action plaintiff] or his aunt. And I
never needed to do so. I knew what needed to be done.").
6. See Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices--
Vhat's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, in Ethical
Issues in Representing Older Clients, 63 Fordhan L. Rev. 1101 (1994); Susan Stefan,
Silencing the Different Voice Competence, Feminist Theory and the Law, 47 U. Miami L.
Rev. 763 (1993); Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts'" From Deference to
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 Yale L.J. 639 (1992). For an
example of a more modest and discerning medical view, see Robert P. Roca, Determining
Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, in Ethical Issues in Representing Older Cli-
ents, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1177 (1994).
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as relatives, about structuring the affairs of a senior citizen of
questionable capacity without the senior citizen present, current profes-
sional regulation is too lax and more definite strictures are needed.
This Article seeks to deal with these issues through a contextual ap-
proach7 to lawyering for senior citizens of questionable capacity. This
approach rejects adherence to either a paternalist or libertarian ap-
proach. Instead, it recognizes that, in the context of everyday lawyer-
client interaction, concern for the senior citizen's welfare and her
autonomy interact. One does not make sense without the other.
The Article analyzes this interaction by advancing three core values:
access, connection, and voice.8 It applies these values to some common
problems of elder law practice: identifying the client,9 defining
capacity, 10 determining what course of action to take if capacity is lack-
ing, 1 handling multiple representation, 2 and disclosing information to
third parties, 3 including diagnosticians and peer groups.
I. CORE VALUES: ACCESS, CONNECTION, AND VOICE
Consideration of the situation of senior citizens and the role of
attorneys suggests three core values: access, connection, and voice. The
values sometimes overlap, and sometimes conflict. Using them as a basis
for analysis, however, does clarify some of the difficult questions that
lawyers face.
A. Access
Access is important both in the traditions and practices of the legal
profession and in the lives of senior citizens. Bar codes of conduct pro-
claim that lawyers have a duty to maximize the availability of legal
services, and provide pro bono services for those who cannot afford mar-
ket rates.4 While cynics might observe that the ideal of service has been
honored mainly in the breach, recent efforts to create meaningful pro
bono programs in law schools and the practicing bar suggest that the
profession has the potential to live up to its own rhetoric.
7. See Naomi R. Cahn, A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 23 (1990); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Femi-
nism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599 (1991).
8. See infra part I.
9. See infra part II.
10. See infra part III.
11. See infra part V.
12. See infra part II.
13. See infra part IV.
14. The veneration of Louis Brandeis for his pro bono work is one manifestation of
this tradition. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice 169-74 (1988).
In February 1993, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted by a vote
of 228-215 an "aspirational plea" for 50 hours of pro bono service from every lawyer. See
Fifty Hours for Pro Bono: ABA House Adopts Ethics Rule Specifying How Much Time
Lawyers Should Donate, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993, at 32; Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct Rule 6.1 cmt. (1993) [hereinafter Model Rules].
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Senior citizens with disabilities, whom I will call challenged seniors,
are one group for whom enhanced access is vital. Seniors are often iso-
lated from other seniors and possessed by insecurity. Seniors often live in
poverty, 15 often on meager fixed incomes. Society treats challenged se-
niors as little better than old furniture. At family gatherings, a chal-
lenged senior is an object of condescension, or a problem to be ignored.
Chronic illness, hearing and visual impairments, cognitive impediments,
and variable functioning intensify isolation and frustrate empowerment.
Yet, traditional legal rules make empowerment even more difficult by
stressing representation of individuals. 6 This isolation of clients is a
staple of the Anglo-American adversary system, which structures law-
yers' duties along litigation lines and distrusts group representation. The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules") partially
undertake to correct this anti-group bias in legal ethics by permitting the
lawyer to work as intermediary. 7 However, the collective representation
sanctioned by the Model Rules creates its own problems of isolation, as it
may in practice allow a lawyer subtly to take sides with one client against
a challenged senior.
B. Connection
Many practitioners and commentators have recognized that the bar's
stress on representation of individuals neglects elements of connection
between persons that make all of us human."8 No one stands alone; we
all are part of a web of relationships that define us. 9 In addition, we
have emotions and values that enter into everything we do. We make
judgments about others based on these values and emotions, regardless of
whether they are included in the job description of the roles we occupy at
our desks.2'
A key insight of much political and social theory is that it is meaning-
less to talk about autonomy solely of individuals. Apart from scientific
curiosities, such as boys raised by wolves and hold-outs from World War
II subsisting on remote Pacific Islands, people exist in groups. Our mem-
bership in groups, whether as family members, citizens, professionals, or
15. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, Elderlaw 22 (1992).
16. For an insightful reinterpretation of the history of American legal ethics norms,
see Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992). Cf Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly". How
the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1201
(1989) (discussing judicial attitudes toward multiple representation in criminal defense).
For a discussion of the limits of the traditional adversarial conception, see Margulies,
supra note 2.
17. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 2.2.
18. See William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469
(1984). Connection has been a special concern for feminist theorists. See Naomi R.
Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 Hastings L.J. 1039, 1061-68 (1992).
19. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 22-23 (1958).
20. See Hannah Arendt, Between Past And Future: Eight Exercises in Political
Thought (1954).
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others, shapes our action in the world.21 Evidence also exists that seniors
place particular value on connection with others, including peers, family,
and friends.22 The experience of seeing friends and loved ones pass away,
an experience undergone by seniors with increasing frequency as they
age, places a premium on connections that survive. The isolation caused
by physical and mental disability increases the value of connection.
The general tendency of legal representation is to compound isolation
by paying insufficient attention to groups, such as the American
Association of Retired Persons (the "AARP"), that offer senior citizens
support.23 A solitary person inspires little fear or respect. By contrast,
people in groups have a greater ability to influence and to persuade
others. Establishing connection with the client and promoting connec-
tion between the client and other seniors facilitates autonomy in the most
meaningful sense.24 While many senior citizens are part of such peer
groups, others have few group involvements. Group involvements tend
to decrease with age and to be fewer for men than for women. 25  For
those with mental disabilities in particular, connection is vital. Mental
illness is a disease of isolation that makes people withdraw into them-
selves. Coaxing people out of this isolation is therapeutic.26 Lawyers
perform a valuable professional service when they integrate challenged
senior citizens into support networks.
Despite the benefits of connection, the profession always has sent
mixed messages on the issue of the scope of a lawyer's relationship with
clients. On the one hand, the Model Rules permit the attorney to offer
advice in a variety of areas that may affect the client, even if those areas
are not strictly legal. On the other hand, the Anglo-American vision of
lawyering, with its somewhat mechanical principal-agent relation, seems
to curtail non-legal conversation between lawyer and client. Yet, elder
law attorneys and commentators have felt the need to address
21. Feminists have explored this point with eloquence. See Cahn, supra note 18.
22. See Smith, supra note 1, at 72.
23. For discussions of lawyers and groups, see Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness
Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers'
Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the
Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 825 (1992); Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious
Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law Practice (1992); Luban, supra note
14.
24. It is ironic that many individual senior citizens still are disempowered while elder
law as a recognized specialty probably owes much to collective movements of senior citi-
zens that go back almost half a century. Cf Edwin Amenta & Yvonne Zylan, It Hap-
pened Here: Political Opportunity, the New Institutionalism, and the Townsend
Movement, 56 Am. Soc. Rev. 250 (1991) (discussing dynamics of senior citizen activism
in the New Deal-era).
25. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to
the Law, 42 Hastings L.J. 683, 703 (1991).
26. See Margulies, supra note 4. Cf David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45
U. Miami L. Rev. 979, 981-84 (1991) (discussing "therapeutic jurisprudence" and its
implications for legal practice).
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interpersonal concerns of clients as part of their conception of competent
representation. Elder law attorneys also recognize that their practice
necessarily involves them with groups such as families, with all the rich-
ness and occasional ambiguity and argument that such work involves.
Because much elder law involves transactional, not litigation, practice,
this group dimension is enhanced.
C. Voice
While connection is important, sometimes involvement with others
can become oppressive. A senior citizen may have a view of the world
that her family or the state do not share. That difference alone is no
reason to abridge the senior citizen's freedom of action.2 Indeed, in a
democracy, the efforts of subordinated groups, such as senior citizens, to
make their voices heard should be cause for both attention and celebra-
tion.28 Yet, paternalistic conceptions of capacity or more mundane
motives of personal gain may spur attempts to control the senior citizen's
decisions.29 In these situations, the lawyer's traditional duty to let the
client's voice be heard assumes center stage.30 The attorney must side
with the senior against a group, such as the family, that is suppressing
27. Later in this Article, I discuss circumstances under which a lawyer or others can
intervene in a client's decisions. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
28. Scholars developing critical race and feminist theory argue that those who are
vulnerable have special knowledge that society should absorb. See Deborah L. Rhode,
Feminist Critical Theories, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 617 (1990); Patricia J. Williams, The Al-
chemy of Race and Rights 5-14 (1991). A similar analysis applies to people with disabili-
ties. See Oliver Sacks, Seeing Voices: A Journey into the World of the Deaf xiii (1989);
Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity 3 (1993).
29. See Julia Spring, Applying Due Process Safeguards, Generations, Summer 1987, at
35.
30. For one pioneering analysis of voice compared with other approaches, see Albert
0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 30-43 (1970). Recent commentators have em-
phasized the citizen's voice, even as they have warned that the overly legalistic perspec-
tive of attorneys can sometimes smother that voice. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri,
Stances, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1233 (1992) (discussing various modern and postmodern
approaches to lawyering); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107 (1991) (examining the loss of
client narratives in lawyer storytelling); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty
Law and a Theory ofDialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 659, 698-
701 (1987-88) (discussing the importance of dialogue in empowering impoverished cli-
ents); Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards
an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1298, 1331-39 (1992) (arguing
that the practice of law involves translation and offering a model of mental activity com-
posed of sensation, experience, and knowledge); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two
Clients: Thinking About Law As Language, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2459, 2460-61 (1989) (ex-
ploring the meaning of the phrase "representing a client"); Lucie E. White, Subordina-
tion, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoer Notes on the Hearing of Mrs G., 38
Buff. L. Rev. 1, 46-48 (1990) (discussing a client who outmaneuvered her lawyer by
abandoning the lawyer's script that "fragment[ed] her voice"). Cf Robert D. Dinerstein,
A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 971, 981-84 (1992) (analyzing
tensions in progressive lawyering literature); Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lavyering
Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 Hastings L.J. 947, 954-59 (1992)
(same).
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her voice. In some cases, alliances with other groups may enhance the
client's voice while coping with behavior that has caused the family's
concern.
31
II. WHO IS THE CLIENT?
The values of access, connection, and voice always provide an answer
to the most widely asked question in elder law: who is the client? These
values require that the client be the person who is most vulnerable in the
situation. Frequently, therefore, a challenged senior will be the client,
even if the attorney's services are being paid for by the senior's child and
even if the child was the person who initially requested the attorney's
services.32
Under this position, lawyers who, at the instruction of a senior's child,
prepare documents for the senior's signature must speak with the senior
as they would with any other client. This result upholds the access prin-
ciple because it gives the senior an opportunity to consult with an
attorney. It also enhances voice and connection because in this situation
the challenged senior citizen may have no one else but the lawyer looking
out for her interests, or even taking her seriously. The child in this case
may also be a client. However, and here this Article and the Model
Rules part company, the attorney's first loyalty is to the challenged se-
nior citizen. 33
In other situations, the lawyer may learn that family members on
whom a challenged senior depends are overreaching by, for example,
misappropriating the senior citizen's assets. In some of these cases, the
lawyer also may represent other family members. The challenged senior
citizen's voice, however, is the one in danger of being smothered. Conse-
quently, the lawyer must treat her obligation to the challenged senior
citizen as paramount.
Contrary to the Model Rules, because an attorney previously has
represented both the senior and other members of the family, her repre-
sentation should not create a mandate for the lawyer to withdraw. On
the contrary, the lawyer has a special duty to the senior in such situa-
tions, particularly where the senior is dependent on family members for
care and is therefore all the more vulnerable. Even if no formal guardi-
31. See, e.g., Peter J. Strauss, Before Guardianship: Abuse of Patient Rights Behind
Closed Doors, 41 Emory L.J. 761, 761-62 (1992) (discussing alliance with church group).
32. Margrit Bernstein has told me that she customarily tries to consider who is the
most vulnerable person in a situation brought to her attention and then undertakes to
represent that person.
33. A corollary of this principle is that the efficiency advantages of multiple represen-
tation, such as representation of both spouses, should be available to clients whose capac-
ity may become questionable, if an attorney believes that they have the capacity to make
particular decisions. Discriminating against persons with capacity, because of concerns
about future capacity, may be a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991), which bars discrimination on the basis of
disability.
1080 [Vol. 62
CAPACITY OF ELDERLY CLIENTS
anship has been created, the attorney should construe her duty to the
challenged senior as she would construe her duty to a ward in a formal
guardianship. She should view the dominant family members as con-
structive fiduciaries.34 The attorney's obligation is to disclose the over-
reaching of the family to both the senior and, if necessary, other
authorities.35
The Model Rules take a different approach.36 Generally, they favor
withdrawal over disclosure, except in cases where the lawyer represents a
guardian who is breaching her fiduciary duty to a ward.37 To require
that the lawyer employ exit and not voice a" when confronted with ex-
ploitation of a vulnerable client codifies professional irresponsibility.
While withdrawal in other situations might tip the victimized client that
something was amiss and prompt her to take corrective action, a chal-
lenged senior citizen dependent on her exploiter may be no better able to
avail herself of this course than the ward of an abusive guardian. With-
drawal in this situation exacerbates the isolation that legal representation
should endeavor to prevent.39
Moreover, the Model Rules approach leads to anomalous results. If a
lawyer represents a guardian and becomes aware of malfeasance toward
the ward, she may be required to disclose it, even though she does not
represent the ward.' However, if she represents both the challenged se-
nior and another family member, who exerts power over the senior but is
not the legal guardian, the lawyer must withdraw and cannot disclose the
malfeasance.4' As a result, under the Model Rules, a lawyer must do less
for a client than for a similarly situated person who is not a client. This
is particularly odd because the more powerful relative in the multiple
representation context is already less accountable to courts and other
agencies because he is not a guardian. Hamstringing the lawyer merely
34. This same construction of fiduciary status independent of formal arrangements
typifies the constructive trust.
35. For discussion of related issues, see Hazard, supra note 3.
36. For discussion of ethical issues involved in representing both spouses, see Teresa
Stanton Collett, And the Two Shall Become As One... Until the Lawyers Are Done, 7
Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 101 (1993); Malcolm A. Moore & Anne K. Hilker,
Representing Both Spouses The New Section Recommendations, Prob. & Prop., July/Au-
gust 1993, at 26.
37. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.14 cmt. 4.
38. For the definitive analysis of these two alternatives, see Hirschman, supra note 30.
39. Similar disclosures have been required of lawyers in the savings and loan cases.
See, e.g., In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 1424, 1452 (D. Ariz. 1992) (stating that attorneys must inform a client that its
conduct violates the law and, if the client continues the wrongful activity, then the attor-
ney must withdraw if further representation will violate the rules of professional
conduct).
40. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.14 cmt. 4.
41. Cf State Bar of Michigan, Comm. on Professional & Judicial Ethics, Mich. Opin-
ion CI-693 (Nov. 1981) (unpublished informal opinion) (attorney who learns that nephew
of deceased client may have misappropriated funds may disclose this to other heirs, but
may not represent any party to the transaction thereafter).
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compounds this lack of accountability.4 2
III. DEFINING CAPACITY
The difficulty of the above questions is merely a warm-up for the rigors
of our next issue: defining capacity. Capacity is the black hole of legal
ethics. Many questions find their way into the capacity category, but few
answers ever emerge. Nor has the collective wisdom of the bar shed
much light on the issue. The sources generally looked to by the profes-
sion-the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Model
Code"), the Model Rules, and the draft Restatement of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers (the "draft Restatement")-have been delphic at best in
formulating tests for capacity. The Model Code says little to guide the
lawyer in assessing a client's capacity, the Model Rules say only slightly
more, while the draft Restatement refers only to what incapacity is not.
Both the Model Rules and the draft Restatement note that capacity is
a flexible concept and that clients can be incapacitated for some purposes
but not for others. The draft Restatement also cautions attorneys that
they should not confuse incapacity with eccentricity or lack of pru-
dence.43 However, neither the Model Rules nor the draft Restatement
offers a working definition of incapacity. Practitioners essentially are left
to their own lights. Indeed, the amorphous nature of capacity, this
reliance on professional discretion may be the better part of valor.
Compared to the efforts of the organized bar, other tests are more
specific, but not necessarily more satisfying. Consider the status and out-
come tests. The outcome test examines whether a client's decision is sub-
stantively correct. The status test focuses on attributes that it views as
negating capacity-age, history of mental illness, or dependence on
others. Few commentators today will admit to using either of these tests,
which clearly suppress the senior citizen's voice. Unfortunately, the ste-
reotypes behind these tests still exert a powerful influence.
One might hope that commentators wary of the starkly authoritarian
and paternalistic tone of the outcome and status tests would develop a
more nuanced alternative. Some commentators, however, have
responded in kind by taking the other extreme. According to antip-
sychiatry commentators, who influenced the initial path of modern
mental health law, the concept of incapacity is merely an excuse for im-
pinging on te autonomy of persons and asserting the authority of the
medical profession. Under this view, the client's expressed wishes con-
trol, even if the client is convinced that her husband is a grapefruit.'
42. In cases of dominant family member malfeasance, the lawyer should be permitted
not to disclose if the misfeasance is entirely rectified by the offending party. This gives
the lawyer an opportunity to work informally with the client to improve the situation,
rather than forcing an adversarial denouement that may be in no one's best interest.
43. See Restatement (Third) of the Law, The Law Governing Lawyers, § 35 cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 1993) [hereinafter Draft Restatement (Third)].
44. Cf George J. Alexander, Avoiding Guardianship, in Protecting Judgment-Im-
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Other commentators acknowledge that this test is an evasion of the
lawyer's responsibility more than a meaningful critique of psychiatry.4 5
They recognize that following the client's expressed wishes can up-end
the client's lifetime commitments and sentence her to great hardship.
These commentators are willing to concede the grapefruit case, but not
necessarily much else.'
The same autonomy concerns that animate this school of thought have
spurred development of the functional approach,47 which is closest to the
one adopted by the Model Rules and draft Restatement. This approach
emphasizes that capacity varies over time and with the decision involved.
Rather than relying on supposedly objective testing instruments, the
functional approach asks how people cope in their regular environment.
For example, instead of asking a senior to name the date, and viewing her
as dangerously disoriented if she cannot, the functional view asks
whether the senior has a newspaper, magazine, or video source available
if she wishes to know the answer to this question. The functional ap-
proach, however, can create problems in its attempt to focus on the pro-
cessa" of senior citizen decision-making.
The process-based view is a valuable tonic to the paternalism of the
status and outcome tests. Clearly, one does not wish to view a senior
citizen as lacking capacity just because she reaches a particular decision
with which one disagrees. The process-based standard, however, raises a
new set of problems. The flight from substance leads to a denial of con-
text-a quest for some pure kernel of capacity free of the ambiguity of
concrete situations. We tend to reify capacity-to make it into a thing to
be discovered. This view misconceives capacity. Rather than being a
thing, capacity is a shifting network of values and circumstances.
Separating substance from process in decisions about capacity is both
wrong and impossible.49 This separation is difficult, even when dealing
with the governmental decisions that courts try to analyze in administra-
tive law, constitutional law, or civil procedure.50 In dealing with the
paired Adults: Issues, Interventions and Policies 163 (Edmund F. Dejowski ed., 1990)
(urging that a living will is a more promising alternative to guardianship).
45. See, e.g., Tremblay, supra note 1 (rejecting extreme antipsychiatry view).
46. See Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations. The Supreme
Court's Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 Viii. L. Rev.
1569 (1992); Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 945 (1991).
47. See Marshall B. Kapp, Evaluating Decisionmaking Capacity in the Elderly: A
Review of Recent Literature, in Protecting Judgment-Impaired Adults, supra note 44, at
17 [hereinafter Kapp, Decisionmaking]; Marshall B. Kapp, Representing Older Persons:
Ethical Challenges, Fla. B.J., June 1989, at 25 [hereinafter Kapp, Ethical Challenges].
48. See Kapp, Ethical Challenges, supra note 47, at 28.
49. Cf Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of
Surrogate Decision Making 51-57 (1989) (opting for a more contextualized view of capac-
ity); Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1121 (1991) (casting
doubt on whether the concept of autonomy has a stable meaning); William H. Simon,
Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 Md. L Rev. 213 (1991)
(same).
50. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. Legal Educ. 27, 32-34
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more informal decisions made by private individuals, the distinction is
untenable. The reasons are twofold. First, ignoring the substance of a
client's wishes requires us to deny our connection to the people we repre-
sent. Human wishes have no existence outside the sphere of human con-
nection. Connections between persons, including lawyer and senior
citizen, shape those wishes. Moreover, wishes expressed one day may
change the next. Challenged senior citizens experience the same conflict
the rest of us do between short-term interests and long-term values.5'
Someone ruled entirely by either short-term or long-term concerns has
no more autonomy than someone ruled by the wishes of another. Con-
nections to others can enhance autonomy for people ruled by certain
short-term concerns, as when people turn to Alcoholics Anonymous to
help deal with their addiction. Focusing on process obscures these
possibilities.
Second, any consideration of process inevitably involves some back-
ground assumptions about substance. When we look at arguably pro-
cess-based concerns, such as whether a senior citizen appreciates the
consequences of a decision or understands alternative courses of action,
we bring to this inquiry some substantive conception of consequences
and alternatives. Suppose that we inquire whether a senior citizen can
state goals and describe how a given decision fits those goals. The attor-
ney still must assess the fit between the goal and the decision that
allegedly will serve that goal. Without some independent conception
about what decisions serve what goals, this assessment cannot take
place.5 2
Rather than standing in opposition to one another, substance and pro-
cess engage in an overlapping dialogue.5 3 A quick example will demon-
strate how our intuitive judgments about capacity take into account both
substantive and procedural components. Consider the case, discussed by
Paul Tremblay in his excellent piece on representing questionably com-
petent clients,54 of a client who is the victim of a fraud that may cost him
his house. The swindler who defrauded your client has a note from your
client for $10,000, secured by your client's house and now wants to fore-
close. Your client is living on Social Security. While you can go to court
to stop the swindler, the client-here I depart somewhat from Paul
Tremblay's scenario-does not want to go to court because then every-
one will know he has been cheated. At the same time, the client is
greatly concerned about losing his home. Concern about appearing to be
(1993); Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process
Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 721, 724-45 (1991).
51. See Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 42-51 (1989).
52. Courts acknowledge this with their holdings and analysis, if not with their rheto-
ric. See, e.g., In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 (Utah 1981) ("That the conclusion
may follow in a logical sequence from the premise is not necessarily sufficient to compel
the conclusion that a person has made a 'responsible decision.' ").
53. See Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand (1990).
54. See Tremblay, supra note 1, at 530-32.
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a fool is a short-term interest of the client, which will be replaced by
regret if the client loses his house. Having a home, in contrast, is a long-
term value. The lawyer has to consider both values and interests, regard-
less of the wishes a client may happen to articulate at a particular point,
to best represent the client. In cases of emergency, the lawyer is justified
in acting against wishes of the client that reflect short-term interest. The
lawyer acts not only to save the client's home, but also to spare the client
regret over the derogation of a value he holds dear.
This analysis will be strong medicine for many practitioners. To assess
whether I am right about the dialogue of substance and process, consider
a different scenario. Suppose that the senior citizen wants to go to court
to save his house. His reason is that the house talks to him at night and
he enjoys the conversation. The process of decision-making in this last
instance is, if anything, far more flawed than in the previous example.
Yet, we will almost certainly go to court as our client has requested. The
fact that we agree with the substance of the client's decision plays an
essential role. For outcomes that seem radically counter-intuitive or that
do violence to a client's lifetime commitments, we naturally will impose
at least a heavier burden of explanation. To pretend otherwise is a failure
of candor that creates dilemmas where there are none and conceals
dilemmas when we need most to grapple with them.
A solution to this problem is a model of contextual capacity,55 which
integrates substantive and procedural concerns. Rather than look at
capacity formalistically, as determined either by some notion of proce-
dure divorced from substance or some assessment of substance unalloyed
with information about a senior citizens's process of decision-making,
this approach recognizes the dialogue between substance and procedure.
Each is part of the landscape of capacity determinations. Six factors are
important: (1) ability to articulate reasoning behind decision; (2) variabil-
ity of state of mind; (3) appreciation of consequences of decision;
(4) irreversibility of decision; (5) substantive fairness of transaction; and
(6) consistency with lifetime commitments.
A. Ability to Articulate Reasoning Behind Decision
Just as administrative agencies must articulate reasons for their deci-
sions, a client should be able to give reasons for her decision. These
reasons must be consistent with goals identified by the client. Consider a
situation confronted by Edward Bennett Williams, one of the century's
best-known American lawyers. 6 Philip Graham, then owner of The
Washington Post, was suffering from a terminal illness. He told Williams
that he wished to redraft his will to cut out his wife, Katherine Graham.
55. See Steven K. Hoge et al., Attorney-Client Decision-Making in Criminal Cases:
Client Competence and Participation as Perceived by their Attorneys, 10 Behav. Sci. & L
385, 386 (1992).
56. For a discussion of this issue, see Evan Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett
Williams, Ultimate Insider; Legendary Trial Lawyer 178-80 (1991).
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He gave no reasons apart from general bitterness. Williams remon-
strated with Philip about this decision over a period of time instead of
immediately carrying out his instructions. Philip died before the will was
changed. Catherine inherited the newspaper and became a pillar of the
Washington establishment. Williams got Catherine's business. Under
the traditional principal-agent approach, Williams's conduct was ques-
tionable. As long as the client is not mistaking his wife for a grapefruit,
capacity is not at issue and the lawyer cannot decline to follow a client's
instructions. Indeed, this case puts the traditional approach in a moder-
ately favorable light. Williams's getting Katherine as a client suggests a
conflict of interest. I would argue, however, that Williams acted consist-
ently with the contextual approach to capacity outlined in this Article.
Articulation of reasons is vital to capacity, especially when the client
wishes to breach lifetime commitments like marriage. 7 If the couple has
been married for a long time, the lawyer should not blithely accept the
client's decision. Rather, he should seek to have the client articulate the
basis for his decision. If no basis is forthcoming from the client, the
lawyer should view the client as lacking the capacity to make this deci-
sion. Client comments like "Because I hate her," or "Because I feel like
it," should not suffice.58 These comments may be the result of passing
anger that will later occasion regret.
One by-product of this insistence on reasons is that the lawyer must
engage the client in a dialogue. The result is a richer awareness for both
lawyer and client.
B. Variability of State of Mind
By variability of state of mind, I mean the extent to which the senior
citizen's level of alertness fluctuates. How significant is variability? It
should come as no surprise that the answer is: "It depends." So, for
example, if a client cannot remember the date, consults a newspaper, and
forgets the date a minute later, or if a client cannot remember that you
are his lawyer, acknowledges you when you explain, and then forgets
shortly thereafter, a more exacting inquiry into capacity is prudent.
Crucial factors in deciding the importance of variability are: (1) the
regularity of changes in alertness and, (2) whether the decision in which
the lawyer is advising the client involves a long-term course of perform-
ance or a one-shot deal. If variability is predictable-if, for example, it is
a function of time of day, with the client being more alert in the morning,
and less so later on- than it is less of a problem. The solution is simply
to talk with the client when the client is most alert. However, if
57. For discussion of lifetime commitments and capacity, see infra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
58. Of course, one spouse may have worthwhile reasons that are too private to be
readily shared with an attorney for taking such a step. A lawyer must be sensitive to
these concerns.
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variability is less regular, then finding a window in which the client is
alert will be more difficult.
The other factor is whether the decision involves a course of perform-
ance, which will require ongoing alertness on the part of the senior, such
as a personal service contract. Where alertness is variable, a decision to
go ahead with the transaction does not reflect capacity.
C. Ability to Understand Consequences
This criterion is related to the articulation of reasons criterion. One
element of articulating reasons for doing something is articulating rea-
sons why one does not want to do something else. Commentators
troubled about this criterion stress its salience in areas such as bioethics,
where consequences are a function of medical prognostication, more of
an art than a science. Deeming citizens incompetent just because they
disagree with their doctors goes back to the crude outcome-based
capacity test that most modem commentators have rejected.59 Yet, in
cases where consequences are dire and the client does not confront them,
concern is appropriate.
Two brief examples illustrate how this factor works. The classic case
involves the patient with severely gangrenous feet who declines to
recognize that, without amputation, she would die. In our hypothetical
of the house foreclosure, a poor client who declined to recognize that, if
he did not contest the foreclosure, he would be homeless also lacks the
ability to understand consequences.
D. Irreversibility of Decision
Certain decisions can be reversed only with great difficulty or cannot
be reversed at all. For example, once our client loses his house, getting it
back will be a chore or may not be possible at all if the swindler turns it
over quickly to another buyer. In this situation, preserving the status
quo is important. It is appropriate to be less willing to defer to the
client's wishes in this situation, particularly if the client also is variable in
her alertness. Variability increases the chances that the client will come
to regret her action. In any case, doing something that cannot be ad-
justed later calls for caution on the part of the attorney. When grouped
with other factors, such as variability, it provides an occasion for
declining to do what the client wishes.
The law historically has attached importance to protecting parties
from irreversible events- the emphasis on irreparable injury in awarding
injunctions, for example, reflects this concern. In the bioethics area,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health ° and other cases that
limit the right to die are even closer to home. Given the variable nature
of all human decisions and the human oscillation between short-term and
59. See Kapp, Ethical Challenges, supra note 47, at 28.
60. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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long-term concerns, a special solicitude for avoiding occasions for regret
is understandable and appropriate as one ingredient in assessing capacity.
E. Substantive Fairness of Transaction
Substantive fairness may be the most controversial criterion on our
list. This criterion raises the specter of outcome-based decision-making.
Yet, substantive unfairness is one factor that suggests that people are
being taken advantage of or are being unduly influenced in ways that
defeat the autonomy and voice rationale behind deferring to client deci-
sions. Earlier commentators have claimed that substantive fairness is the
only factor that courts really look at.6" While this avowedly realist view
gives courts too little credit, going to the other extreme and ignoring
blatantly unfair transactions denies the connection that we owe to senior
citizens. If people are exploited, we should care about that as one
element in a contextual assessment of capacity.
F. Consistency of Lifetime Commitments
A client decision that may appear substantively unfair may not present
a capacity problem if it is consistent with lifetime commitments. Sup-
pose a senior citizen wants to deed her house over to her daughter and
then continue to live there as a tenant. Even if the daughter pays only
minimal consideration for the house, the commitment between mother
and daughter legitimizes this transaction.6" Consistency with lifetime
commitments is a hallmark of substitute judgment analysis, a staple of
bioethical inquiry. No conception of voice makes sense without
considering how lifetime commitments to people, places, and things con-
tribute to that voice. Similarly, a conception of connection must consider
lifetime commitments that comprise the salient connections of the senior
citizen.
For this reason, loss of a house is a special cause for concern.
Similarly, disinheritance of a spouse also reflects violence to lifetime
commitments. In another situation, consider the case, related to me by a
legal services lawyer and not uncommon in its broad outlines, of a client
living with one hundred cats. Neighbors complain about the smell and
the family is concerned. Yet, taking care of animals may be the closest
thing to meaning in the client's life. Without more, it is not grounds for
a finding of lack of capacity. If the client declines to get rid of the cats,
even in the face of threatened court action, the lawyer should help the
61. See, e.g., Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 Case
W. Res. 307, 314-329 (1989) (discussing Dean Milton Green's theory of capacity).
62. Cynthia Barrett has brought to my attention a slightly more troubling hypotheti-
cal in which a relative who cares for the senior citizen takes small sums of money from
the senior citizen's assets. The analysis here, despite the more troubling facts, is identical
to that in the text. If the senior is aware of her relative's practice and does not object, the
commitment present between these family members should prevail over the temptation
for the lawyer to intervene on behalf of the senior citizen's best interests.
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client fight. The lawyer should not do what a lawyer described to me
did-take the client out for a movie and have a group of other lawyers
get rid of the cats.
These six factors represent a dialogue of substance and process. The
first three factors-ability to state reasons, variability of state of mind,
and comprehension of consequences-have both a procedural and sub-
stantive character. In the last three factors-irreversibility of decisions,
consistency with lifetime commitments, and substantive fairness-sub-
stance is the central concern. This interaction of substance and process
presents a richer picture of capacity than any vain attempt to isolate
either mode. An exclusively procedural view would provide only a
mechanical view of autonomy that ignores the enabling role of connec-
tion, commitment, and freedom from exploitation. By the same token,
an exclusively substantive focus would permit wholesale second-guessing
of clients and therefore impede access and voice.
In contrast, the interaction of substantive and procedural factors
serves the values of access, connection, and voice. The attention to pro-
cess enhances access and voice because it requires the attorney to engage
in serious dialogue with the client to consider if the client understands
consequences, articulates reasons, and does not vary unduly in positions.
In addition, the rejection of a test based on the client's status-whether
the client is elderly or has a history of mental illness-broadens access by
at least letting clients get in the lawyer's door.63 Connection is served
because the lawyer must assume some responsibility for what will happen
to the client as a result of a given decision. Will the decision be
irrevocable? Is the transaction fair? Is it consistent with lifetime com-
mitments? The connection here is human, not mechanical.
Another hypothetical illustrates how this approach works. Consider a
client who has executed a power of attorney for his son to be triggered by
the father's incapacity.64 The father has been sighted wandering around
a park at night; his house is dirty. Father and son have argued about the
father's living conditions and the father's drinking. The father tells the
lawyer that he wants to prevent his son from getting one cent of his
money. Here, a contextual view of capacity suggests that we break down
the problem into two issues: (1) whether the power of attorney kicks
because the father is displaying a general lack of capacity and (2) must
the lawyer follow the father's instructions about cutting off the son?
The answer to the first question is no. The father has not demon-
63. For discussion of the pervasiveness of status-based capacity determinations, see
Buchanan & Brock, supra note 49, at 282-83 (expert affidavit in conservatorship proceed-
ing stated without analysis that "'proposed conservatee is unable to manage her own
affairs and is suffering from chronic brain syndrome associated with cerebral arterioscle-
rosis;'" countervailing evidence suggested that proposed conservatee was healthy and
paid her bills regularly) (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976)).
64. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 2.1 ("the attorney's first contact with a potential
client may be with the client's adult child").
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strated any general lack of capacity. A dirty house is not a sign of
incapacity and may only be an indication that the client should have
access to home care. Seeking a declaration of incapacity only may pave
the way for the client's admission to a nursing home, which will in no
way guarantee that the client does better with cleanliness than he is doing
presently given the neglect that typifies many nursing homes. Considera-
tions of voice direct that the lawyer not irrevocably cede to another the
client's ability to speak for himself.
However, as to the second question, the capacity factors set out above
suggest that the lawyer need not follow the client's instructions, at least
without more facts. The client has given no reasons for his wish that his
son receive none of his money. There is no indication that the client
understands the consequences of his decision. These factors are
especially important in light of the lifetime commitment between father
and son. The client's drinking may be distorting his voice and thus
render it a less than definitive guide for the lawyer.
This hypothetical demonstrates that capacity is not a unitary, all or
nothing phenomenon. One can have capacity for some purposes, but not
for others. The contextual approach best captures the dynamic nature of
capacity determinations.
IV. TOOLS IN EVALUATING AND ENHANCING CAPACITY: A
PROACTIVE ROLE FOR LAWYERS
The dynamic nature of capacity decisions requires that lawyers be
flexible and proactive. Elder lawyering sensitive to contextual capacity
features four elements treated in this section of the Article. These four
elements are: (1) seeking services and benefits that strengthen senior
citizen capacity; (2) using peer groups of senior citizens as a resource; (3)
making practice environments accessible; and (4) seeking the advice of a
mental health professional when necessary.
A. Seeking Services and Benefits
Often what we view as incapacity is simply the product of society
allocating resources in a certain way. For example, intuitively, we view a
senior citizen whose house is dirty and disheveled as a prime suspect for
incapacity. Yet, the real problem may be the lack of funding for home
assistance programs. Here, access may require that the lawyer seek
home care services for the client and counsel the client to accept them if
they can be arranged.
B. Peer Groups
De Tocqueville observed that residents of the United States are forever
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forming associations.65 The self-help revolution of the past fifteen years
has accelerated this trend. Thousands of self-help groups have sprouted
dealing with the spectrum of our discontents. More venerable groups,
such as the AARP, are major players in Washington. Yet, as noted
before, the many groups dealing with senior citizens do not necessarily
have an impact on the daily work of elder law practitioners, even in the
vital area of capacity determinations. These groups have a pragmatic
perspective that can enrich elder law practice and help resolve difficult
issues such as capacity.
Lawyers should look to senior citizen peer groups in a variety of situa-
tions. First, senior citizen groups can help gather data on the six factors
central to contextual capacity determinations. A client may be more
willing to talk to members of a senior citizen group than to the lawyer.
Senior citizen groups can help fill gaps in the lawyer's knowledge of the
client.
Second, senior citizen groups can help fill gaps in the lawyer's knowl-
edge of senior citizens. For example, a lawyer may be frustrated by a
client who declines to sign a trust agreement that takes away her control
over her assets so that she can qualify for Medicaid. The lawyer may
view her client as being irrational, and an ingrate to boot. After all, the
attorney has gone to the trouble of drafting an artful, precise, and elegant
trust agreement. The purpose of the agreement is benign and the
reasoning is prudent. If the senior citizen does not sign the agreement,
but at some point needs to enter a nursing home, long-term care will
consume all of her assets. What's not to like?
A senior citizen group can explain to the puzzled attorney that many
senior citizens prize control over assets even more as age erodes their
control over other matters. For a younger person, relinquishing some
control in the interest of long-term growth is often an attractive option.
For the senior citizen, the long term is now.
In addition to providing insight and information, senior citizen groups
can provide services. Take the case of the man with one hundred cats.
The lawyer could act unilaterally to dispose of the cats, as the lawyer did
in this case. As an alternative, the lawyer could do nothing and wait for
neighbors, family, or the local authorities to go to court. The outcome of
such litigation could be a guardianship and/or commitment to a nursing
home or psychiatric hospital. The cats would be gone and the client's
connection and voice would not be far behind.
A proactive attorney would find a group like "Seniors Who Love Cats
Too Much."66 Members of the group are other seniors with many cats,
even if not one hundred of them. Group members can help the senior
65. See Mexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 198-202 (Richard D. Heffner
ed. 1956).
66. I do not know if such a group exists. If it does not, it should. Elder law attorneys
who frequently face such problems could be helpful in forming the group. It would be a
worthwhile investment of their time.
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ration his care-giving better. In addition, they can volunteer respite care
for some of these pesky felines. 67 They also can tell the client about
seniors in a nearby nursing home with their own needs for pet therapy.
Some of the client's cats can meet this need. The client might feel that he
has retained control, helped others, and effectively delegated to others
the task of enhancing Little Friskies' price/earnings ratio.68 Such
problem-solving is possible, but only if lawyers reach out beyond their
traditional roles.69
C. Accessibility
Lawyers also must reach out to make their offices accessible. In the
elder law setting, this requires some accommodations.7" First, offices
should not have glare, which can cause discomfort and distraction for
senior citizens. Second, offices should be accessible for people in wheel-
chairs or should be complemented by space that is accessible. Third,
elder law attorneys must be prepared, despite the cost in time and
money, to make house calls.71 Seeing a senior citizen in the environment
in which she lives provides indispensable information about how the
citizen copes-information that may be distorted through the lens of
more artificial interactions in the law office. Moreover, house calls breed
trust, a scarce commodity in today's citizen-professional relationships.
Particularly if capacity is at issue, an attorney should not make any deci-
sion that impinges on the client's freedom of action-such as seeking
appointment of a guardian or taking action as a de facto guardian 2
without first making a house call.
D. Consultation with a Diagnostician
Proactive lawyering often may obviate the need to consult a mental
health professional. In some cases, however, consultation with a
67. Such groups also could confirm for the lawyer the therapeutic character of pets
for the client.
68. Similar approaches would be beneficial for people with Collyer Syndrome. Col-
lyer Syndrome is a clinical term for "pack rats" who obsessively keep everything and
discard nothing. As a result, the houses of people with Collyer Syndrome are often clut-
tered with shopping bags, old newspapers, and sundry other items that are part of the fine
print of a life. A peer group, the Collyer Syndrome Survivors, for example, could help
the client store his belongings more efficiently, while keeping everything important to
him.
69. For an example of lawyer-peer group collaboration in the context of a woman
suing a psychiatrist who had sexually abused her, see Ruth Buchanan & Louise G.
Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest
Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 687, 698-99 (1992).
70. On the concept of accommodations generally, see the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
71. See Erika F. Wood, Doing Well by Doing Good: Providing Legal Services to the
Elderly in a Paying Private Practice, ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly,
pt.12 (1985), reprinted in, Frolik & Barnes, supra note 15, at 72.
72. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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clinician may be advisable, particularly where discussions with a group
of the client's peers yield no definitive insights. Much of the literature
ties itself into knots on this issue. The Model Rules and the draft Re-
statement recognize that consultation with a diagnostician may be appro-
priate,13 but do not explain when or how. One concern is that the
diagnostician's evaluation may be used for purposes, such as seeking a
guardianship, that adversely affect the client's liberty. Another concern
is that, in cases of questionable capacity, the client's consent to the law-
yer to consult the client's clinician may itself be of dubious validity be-
cause consent also requires capacity.
We can deal with the first issue by prohibiting the lawyer from using
the opinion of the clinician as a basis for, or evidence of, the need for
guardianship. As for the second issue, the concept of contextual capacity
suggests that clients consenting to attorney contact with their clinician
simply assist the lawyer in doing her job. Viewed in this light, such con-
sent serves the values of access, connection, and voice.
Prohibiting the client from consenting reduces her access to an
attorney. It also compromises voice and connection. If a client does not
even control her medical records, she has little voice left. If the client
cannot authorize the disclosure of her medical records, she cannot ex-
press the trust in her lawyer that underlies her willingness to disclose.7 4
If one argues that the proper route here is immediately to appoint a
guardian, even greater curtailment of the client's independence results.
The virtue of allowing the lawyer to seek an opinion from a clinician is
that it can accomplish the same result as a guardianship, while being
tailored more closely to the client's strengths.75
V. WHAT TO Do IF THE CLIENT LACKS CAPACITY: THE LAVYER'S
ROLE
Practitioners exhausted from the inquiry into capacity might be
tempted to relax once the determination is made. Unfortunately, as
usual, there is no rest for the weary. Instead, other puzzles present them-
selves. Most importantly, a lawyer representing a client without capacity
must decide whether to make decisions herself, on the client's behalf,
and/or whether to seek appointment of a guardian.
In this situation, lawyers receive some greater assistance from the bar.
The Model Code, the Model Rules, and the draft Restatement allow
73. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.14 cmt. 5; Draft Restatement (Third),
supra note 42, § 35 cmt. c.
74. One way of dealing with these issues is to relax the bar's restrictions on ownership
of law practices by nonlawyers. Diversified service groups, owned and staffed by both
lawyers and medical professionals, could represent senior citizens much more efficiently.
See Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversi-
fication, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 559 (1992).
75. While courts have the authority to tailor guardianships in this way, in practice
most guardianships are plenary since this is "easier" for all concerned-apart from the
ward.
1994] 1093
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
lawyers to make decisions for clients in some situations.7 6 The Model
Rules have absorbed much of the heat for this expansion of role because
of their use of the loaded term "de facto guardian."77 The draft Restate-
ment avoids this loaded terminology and offers some guidance about
when attorneys should make decisions for the client. In essence, the
draft Restatement allows the lawyer to make decisions when emergencies
exist.78 In such situations, the benefits of a given decision are clear7 9 and
appointment of a guardian is too time-consuming to be helpful.8° Our
house foreclosure situation meets these criteria.8" The concept of de
facto guardianship, however, hardly has met universal approbation.
Many thoughtful commentators are wary of the de facto guardian role,
arguing that it gives too much power to lawyers, subjects them to the risk
of substantial liability, and resists manageable standards.82 This view
favors the formalities of guardianship imposed after due process and with
judicial monitoring for abuse of fiduciary duty. The problem with this
approach is that it unduly promotes guardianship, an intrusive and often
permanent and plenary course, over lawyer discretion, which can be tem-
porary, informed by relevant opinion, such as the opinion of diagnosti-
cians and peer groups, and less restrictive of the citizen's liberty. There
is no question that there are profound risks that these commentators
have exposed in the lawyer's assumption of a de facto guardianship role.
However, the concern for lawyer overreaching and loss of legitimacy that
animate this view coexist with other more prosaic factors. For example,
as Professor Jacqueline Allee points out, the lawyer risks liability when
she assumes such a role.83 In contrast, waiting for a guardian or
guardian ad litem offers the lawyer a safe harbor from litigation and lia-
bility. Given doubt about a client's capacity, waiting is the best alterna-
tive for the risk-averse attorney.
Some of the role morality that characterizes attorneys in litigation
reappears in this view. Attorneys in the adversarial mode are fond of
saying that it is not for them to judge the liability or guilt or innocence of
their client-that is a job for judge and jury. Similarly, attorneys dealing
with questionably competent clients argue that it is not their role to as-
sess the capacity of a client or to ever make decisions for a client without
76. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-12; Model Rules, supra note
14, Rule 1.14 cmt. 2; Draft Restatement (Third), supra note 43, § 35 cmt. d.
77. See Model Rules, supra note 14, Rule 1.14 cmt. 2.
78. See Draft Restatement (Third), supra note 43, § 35 cmt. d.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. Comment d states that
a lawyer representing an elderly and disabled client in a landlord-tenant dispute
may, without seeking appointment of a guardian, file a paper that will protect
the client against eviction when the client is unable to understand the need to
file the paper and it is clear that the client's interests will be served by retaining
the client's present living arrangements.
82. See Allee, supra note 1, at 39; Tremblay, supra note 1, at 544-47.
83. See Allee, supra note 1, at 39-41.
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capacity-instead this is a job for a guardian. The problem with this
conception of role here, as in the adversarial context, is that it gives the
attorney too easy an exit from tough problems. In an emergency, for
example, there is no time to appoint a guardian. So the neat system of
roles breaks down. At these moments, the role-based argument against
de facto guardianship, advanced by many thoughtful advocates and com-
mentators, begins to look more like the disease of bureaucracy and
evasion of responsibility that the modern age has foisted upon us. Just as
we need to reinvent government, so we need to make the legal profession
more responsive.
The de facto guardianship approach has two cardinal virtues. First, as
noted, it deals with problems where time is of the essence, such as the
house foreclosure scenario. Second, de facto guardianship deals with the
needs of impoverished seniors for whom guardianship is impractical be-
cause little money is involved. Under the anti-de facto guardian ap-
proach, a lawyer would be left with no resort in the loss of home scenario
if the client did not respond to counseling. The deadline for responding
to the foreclosure motion would pass, no guardian would have yet been
appointed to act for the client, and the client would be out on the street.84
In addition, given that capacity is variable with everyone, the senior who
is more lucid tomorrow when he is out on the street may be more than a
little angry with his attorney for not taking action to save his home. The
client rightly may be more than a little puzzled if the lawyer explains that
she was merely trying to preserve the client's autonomy. One can more
readily exercise autonomy with a roof over one's head. At the very least
therefore, there should be room for de facto guardianship when the
alternative is violence to lifetime commitments-and necessities-such as
a house, whose loss can occasion great regret.
The next inquiry concerns what the standard should be for the lawyer
as de facto guardian. One possibility is the best interest standard, which
simply allows the guardian to do what she feels is in the best interest of
the ward. The pcoblem with this approach is that, like the outcome test
for capacity described above, it gives the lawyer too much discretion.
Reacting to this problem, one thoughtful commentator has proposed that
de facto guardians observe a variant of the substituted judgment test
under which they seek to make decisions consistent with the lifetime
commitments of the ward. 5 The draft Restatement in essence adopts
this view.8 6
This approach is familiar from the bioethics literature and case law.
84. One could argue that this unfortunate case is merely the price one pays for a rule
that prevents lawyer overreaching in other instances-few rules fit perfectly and a restric-
tive rule on de facto guardianship may work better in the majority of cases. The answer,
however, is to constrain de facto guardianship with common sense criteria, not to pro-
hibit it.
85. See Smith, supra note 1.
86. See Draft Restatement (Third), supra note 43, § 35 cmt. d.
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The virtue of this approach is that it requires consultation with the client
and her family instead of offering the lawyer carte blanche. The difficulty
with this approach is that it often melds into the best interests test.87 In
any ambiguous situation, figuring out what the client would have wanted
had she been competent necessarily requires some conception of what the
client's best interests are, while discerning her best interests makes no
sense unless one asks what decision would be consistent with the deci-
sions made by the client over a lifetime.
The better approach is to avoid the meaningless distinctions between
best interest and substituted judgment, just as we avoided the distinctions
between a substantive and procedural view of capacity. The contextual
approach works well here, with the added element of concern for the
public interest. This approach accommodates both consideration of life-
time commitments and consideration of the substantive fairness of under-
lying transactions.
For example, in the house foreclosure situation, fighting the
foreclosure will serve the public interest for two reasons. First, the fail-
ure to fight will permit a swindler to continue his depredations, targeting
others in the future. Second, if the senior citizen is on the street, society
will assume the burden of caring for her one way or the other. This
consideration of the public interest fits with the connection value. Under
a regime of connection, surgically separating public and individual inter-
ests is impossible. Instead, public and private overlap. Harms to the
individual are harms to the community, and harms to the community are
harms to the individual. A contextual approach recognizes this fact and
allows the lawyer to act on it. In related areas of surrogate decision-
making, courts have recognized that the public interest or the interest of
third parties is a legitimate factor to be considered.88
VI. LEGAL ETHICS IN THE GUARDIANSHIP PROCESS
When representing clients who are the subject of guardianship or in-
87. See Flick, supra note 49, at 1147 & n.92.
88. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-287 (1990);
Stanley S. Herr et al., No Place to Go: Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment by Compe-
tent Persons with Physical Disabilities, 8 Issues in L. & Med. 3, 30-34 (1992). In another
area where a mechanical view of principal-agent relations has long prevailed, namely, the
fiduciary duty of boards of directors to stockholders, commentators recently have argued
for broader latitude for directors to consider the public interest. See, e.g., Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1165, 1229
(1990) (noting that "[c]orporate responsibility to employers, suppliers, customers, and
the broader community is still an issue of hot debate and little action"); Daniel J.
Morrissey, Toward A New/Old Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 Syracuse L.
Rev. 1005, 1006-07 (1989) (arguing that the law should require corporations to under-
take ethical and philanthropic activities); see also Fla. Stat. ch. 607.0830(3) (1993) ("In
discharging his duties, a director may consider such factors as the director deems rele-
vant, including.., the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any action on the em-
ployees, suppliers, customers of the corporation . . ., the communities and society in
which the corporation ... operate, and the economy of the state and nation.")
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voluntary commitment proceedings, the values of access, connection, and
voice call for the vigorous adversarial approach familiar from the advo-
cacy setting coupled with a willingness to counsel the client in
appropriate situations. Here, the voice factor is uppermost. The attor-
ney is the only person standing with the client against the power of the
state. Access cuts the same way. In the community or as an independent
person without a guardian, the client has access to a variety of services
on her own. However, once in an institution-the inevitable end point of
many guardianships as well as the result of commitment-the client is
cut off from services and dependent on the good graces of institutional
staff. With guardianship, too, the guardian is paid from the assets of the
ward, thereby depleting those assets and further reducing the client's ac-
cess to services. Connection tells the same tale. The institutionalization
that often follows guardianship removes connections with others and iso-
lates the client. Often for seniors the experience of being institutionalized
is so alienating that the will to live is a casualty. Lawyers who take their
clients seriously and respect their desire to live independently, while
counseling them to accept help if it is needed, preserve their client's con-
nection with the world.
Attorneys for respondents are not the only lawyers with obligations in
the guardianship process. Many respondents in guardianship proceed-
ings have no access to counsel, and indeed are not present at the proceed-
ings themselves.89 This sad situation suggests two duties for lawyers who
represent families or other petitioners in guardianship proceedings.
These lawyers should have a duty to seek counsel for the proposed ward
and to insist on the proposed ward's attendance at the hearing. This
deprivation makes a mockery of access, connection, and voice. Senior
citizens are deprived of access to the decision-makers with control over
their lives. They have no connection with these decision-makers, who, in
turn, lack the opportunity to see the subject of their decisions.9"
Obviously, voice goes out the window as well since one who is not pres-
ent cannot speak.
Attorneys for petitioners in guardianship proceedings may respond
that this may well be true but that it is a matter for substantive law, not
for legal ethics. This argument fails, however, for two reasons. First, it
makes the same mistake repeatedly described in this Article. It separates
perspectives on law-substance and process, best interests and substi-
tuted judgment, legal ethics and substantive law-that interact con-
stantly. The savings and loan cases, which hold lawyers liable for fraud
initiated by their clients, demonstrate the convergence of legal ethics and
89. See Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservator-
ship in California, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 273, 281 (1988); Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity
and Self-Determination in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Pro-
posalfor Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1818, 1880 (1992).
90. This is true even though presence in court is constitutionally guaranteed in other
situations, such as criminal proceedings, where a loss of liberty may result.
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substantive law. 91 Courts simply have created new rules of legal ethics
on their own, without waiting for the bar to catch up.
The second reason why this position is wrong is that it fails to consider
the values that underlie even present ethical commands. In essence, if
not in form, attorneys who seek guardianship without the presence of the
proposed ward engage in ex parte communication with the decision-
maker. This conduct is inappropriate when it occurs in other situations
and its effective occurrence here should also be forbidden. Viewing this
as ex parte communication means that a lawyer representing a party
petitioning for guardianship cannot avoid responsibility for the respon-
dent's absence by claiming that the judge approved the absence. Judges
lack the power to approve certain glaring problems with proceedings
before them-they cannot, for example, consent to ex parte contacts on
the substance of a case even if they should wish to. This also should be a
rule of substantive law on guardianships, but, as with the law of privi-
leges and fiduciary duty, both substantive law and ethical standards are
required.
With these safeguards, a hearing can be an educational and therapeutic
experience for the senior, even if the outcome is not favorable. Hearing
an attorney put forward the best arguments for the continued liberty of
the client and hearing a court's reasoned discussion of those arguments
can introduce a note of reality testing for a client.92 It also can reduce
the alienation that unfortunately typifies most senior citizen encounters
with the legal system.
CONCLUSION
Representing senior citizens of questionable capacity requires all of the
virtues of the good lawyer. The values of access, connection, and voice
can help guide lawyer and client. These values shape a contextual view
of representing clients with questionable capacity.
The contextual view rejects the mechanical principal-agent view of the
lawyer-client relationship. It also rejects the paternalism that strips
clients of voice to enhance their well-being. In striving for a third way,
the contextual approach sheds light on difficult issues in elder law. For
example, under a contextual approach, a lawyer who represents a chal-
lenged senior as well as other family members has an obligation to con-
sider first the challenged senior's needs. Moreover, a contextual
approach endorses the lawyer's role as de facto guardian in emergencies
91. See, e.g., In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794
F. Supp. 1424, 1452 (D. Ariz. 1992) (stating that an attorney must inform her client that
the client's conduct violates the law and, if the client continues the wrongful activity,
then the attorney must withdraw if further representation will violate the rules of profes-
sional conduct).
92. See generally Wexler & Winick, supra note 26, at 997-1001 (proposing to com-
bine analysis of competency with defendant's participation in trial procedures and treat-
ment programs).
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where the lawyer's default would compromise the client's lifetime com-
mitments. In addition, a contextual approach offers an alternative to
looking at capacity solely as a function either of the wisdom of decisions
or of some abstract decision-making process divorced from the substance
of decisions in the world.
Viewing capacity as an overlapping dialogue between substance and
process encourages lawyers to participate in the dialogue themselves and
to bring in other parties to the conversation such as senior citizen peer
groups. The lawyer's work, as well as the efforts of government, peer
groups, and family, can influence the situations in which we assess
capacity. The result is enhanced access, connection, and voice for citi-
zens too often disempowered by the legal process.

